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TRANSNATIONAL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 
Christopher A. Whytock* 
The study of access to justice has long had a strong domestic focus. This 
Article draws attention to a different aspect of access to justice, one that has, so 
far, received comparatively little attention: transnational access to justice. This 
Article presents a typology of transnational access-to-justice problems, explains 
why those problems are distinctive and important to understand and address, and 
proposes an agenda for further transnational access-to-justice research. Part I 
defines the concept of transnational access to justice. Part II develops a typology 
of transnational access-to-justice problems, including different types of 
transnational access-to-justice gaps and conflicts. It shows that although some 
transnational access-to-justice problems are similar to those that arise in 
domestic disputes, they tend to be exacerbated by the transnational context. Other 
transnational access-to-justice problems are distinctive because they result from 
the decentralized structure of the global legal system and generally do not arise 
in domestic disputes. Part II also shows that transnational access to justice is 
affected by international institutions in ways that domestic access to justice 
ordinarily is not. Part III argues that another reason to focus on access to justice 
from a transnational, as well as a domestic perspective, is that access to justice is 
a global governance problem, not only a domestic governance problem. By 
incorporating the perspective of parties in transnational disputes, and by 
situating access to justice in the context of the global legal system and global 
governance, this Article aims to contribute to a more complete understanding of 
the range of access-to-justice problems that exist in the world and how those 
problems might be mitigated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of access to justice has long had a domestic focus. International 
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) promote access to 
justice in States1 around the world.2 In addition, there are numerous in-depth 
academic studies considering access to justice in different States' domestic legal 
systems,3 as well as important cross-national comparative research on access to 
justice.4 There also is work in related fields, including human rights and private 
 
 1. In international law, "State" is a term of art that is generally used instead of "nation" or 
"country." Specifically, "a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, 
under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal 
relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). In this Article, the term "State" has its international legal meaning, and 
does not refer to an individual state of the United States. 
 2. See, e.g., Julinda Beqiraj & Lawrence McNamara, International Access to Justice: Barriers 
and Solutions (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Report), INT'L BAR ASS'N (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/485_iba_report_060215.pdf?showdocument=1. 
 3. See, e.g., SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015) (United States); Sherie Gertler, Legal Aid and International 
Obligation: Ensuring Access to Justice in the Liberian Context, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 955 
(2014) (Liberia); Meena Jagannath, Nicole Phillips & Jeena Shah, A Rights-Based Approach to 
Lawyering: Legal Empowerment As an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 NW. U. J. 
INT'L HUM. RTS. 7 (2011) (Haiti). For an overview of other national studies, see Roderick A. 
MacDonald, Access to Civil Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
492, 498–501 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). 
 4. See, e.g., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON UNMET 
LEGAL NEED (Asher Flynn & Jacqueline Hodgson eds., 2017). The seminal example is the 
monumental multi-volume comparative access-to-justice series edited by Mauro Cappelletti and 
Bryant Garth. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective—A General Report, in 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 
(Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978). 
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international law, that has important implications for access to justice beyond 
purely domestic contexts.5 
Nevertheless, work on access to justice has been predominantly domestic in 
three ways: First, it has focused on access-to-justice problems from the 
perspective of persons in domestic disputes. Second, it has emphasized access to 
justice in particular domestic legal systems.6 Third, it has understood access to 
justice as a problem of domestic governance.7 
This Article looks beyond domestic access to justice. Specifically, it draws 
attention to an aspect of access to justice that so far has largely escaped systematic 
analysis: transnational access to justice—that is, access to justice for persons in 
transnational disputes.8 As this Article argues, transnational access-to-justice 
problems are important and distinctive. To understand the full range of access-to-
justice problems that exist in the world, access to justice studies must include the 
perspective of parties in transnational disputes, understand these problems in the 
context of the global legal system, and treat them as problems of global 
governance, not only domestic governance.9 
 
 5. See, e.g., JAMES J. FAWCETT, MÁIRE NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SANGEETA SHAH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) (discussing access to justice in context of 
European private international law); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW (3rd ed. 2015) (discussing the right to a remedy for human rights violations); AM. ASS'N OF PRIV. 
INT'L L., Principles on Transnational Access to Justice (2016), http://www.asadip.org/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/ASADIP-TRANSJUS-EN-FINAL18.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2019) 
(proposing inter-American principles of civil procedure aimed at ensuring transnational access to 
justice). 
 6. See, e.g., works cited supra in notes 2 and 3. 
 7. See, e.g., Michael M. Karayanni, The Extraterritorial Application of Access to Justice 
Rights: On the Availability of Israeli Courts to Palestinian Plaintiffs, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 210, 218 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 
2014) (arguing that "[t]he most fundamental value…is achieving access to justice as a basic tool in a 
participatory democracy" and that "[t]o have access to justice means to belong to the realm of societal 
decision; to be excluded from one is to be denied the other"). See also UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (Sept. 3, 2004), 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-
publications-for-website/access-to-justice-practice-note/Justice_PN_En.pdf ("There are strong links 
between establishing democratic governance, reducing poverty and securing access to justice."). 
 8. See Jacques Ziller, Administering Global Governance: The Issue of Access to Justice, in 
THE WORLD WE COULD WIN: ADMINISTERING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 38, 42–43 (Geraldine Fraser-
Moleketi ed., 2005) ("L'étude de l'accès à la justice dans des cadres régionaux et mondiaux reste à 
mener à bien."). There have, however, been several prior efforts to draw attention to transnational 
access to justice. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011); Antoni 
Pigrau & Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, Seeking Justice in a Multipolar World: Reflections on a Global 
Standard of Access to Justice for Transnational Litigation, Presented at Research Forum of the Am. 
Soc'y of Int'l L. (Oct. 21, 2012); AM. ASS'N OF PRIV. INT'L L., supra note 5 at preface and art. 4.9. 
 9. See Javier L. Ochoa Munoz, Transnational Access to Justice and Global Governance 
(Introductory Comments to the ASADIP Principles on Transnational Access To Justice), 20 REVISTA 
DE DIREITO BRASILEIRA 336 (2018) (abstract) ("Access to justice today is one of the most important 
human rights, which is not limited to the scope of local legal relations, but also involves transnational 
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The Article develops this argument in three parts. Part I defines the concept 
of transnational access to justice. Part II presents a typology of transnational 
access-to-justice problems—including different types of transnational access-to-
justice gaps and conflicts—and points out their distinguishing features. It shows 
that some transnational access-to-justice problems are similar to those that arise 
in domestic disputes but tend to be exacerbated by the transnational context. Other 
transnational access-to-justice problems are distinctive because they are due to 
the decentralized structure of the global legal system and generally do not arise in 
domestic disputes. Part II also explains how transnational access to justice is 
affected by international institutions in ways that domestic access to justice 
typically is not. Part III argues that another reason to focus on access to justice 
from a transnational as well as domestic perspective is that access to justice is a 
global governance problem, not only a domestic governance problem. 
International law and international organizations recognize and aim to promote 
access to justice, and transnational access to justice can improve the quality of 
global governance. For all of these reasons, it is important for research on access 
to justice to be attentive to transnational access-to-justice problems. The Article 
concludes by proposing an agenda for further transnational access-to-justice 
work. 
By incorporating the perspective of parties in transnational disputes and 
situating access to justice in the context of the global legal system and global 
governance, this Article aims to foster a more comprehensive understanding of 
the range of access-to-justice problems that exist in the world and how those 
problems might be mitigated. 
I. 
THE CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
This Article defines "transnational access to justice" as access to justice for 
persons in transnational disputes.10 Transnational disputes are disputes that have 
connections—personal or territorial—to more than one State.11 A personal 
connection is an affiliation between a State and a person involved in, or affected 
by, a dispute.12 Examples of personal connections include nationality, citizenship, 
habitual residence, domicile, statutory seat, or principal place of business. A 
 
legal relations.")  
(https://go.gale.com/ps/anonymous?id=GALE%7CA598536992&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&l
inkaccess=abs&issn=2237583X&p=AONE&sw=w). 
 10. Cf. AM. ASS'N OF PRIV. INT'L L. supra note 5, at preface and art. 4.9 (referring in preface to 
"transnational private litigation," including "judicial proceedings involving foreign elements"). 
 11. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
481 (2011) [hereinafter Whytock, The Evolving Forum] ("By definition, transnational disputes have 
connections to more than one country. These connections may be territorial when the activity or its 
effects touch the territory of more than one country; or they may be based on legal relationships 
between a country and the actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as citizenship."). 
 12. Id. 
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territorial connection is a connection between a dispute and the territory of a 
State.13 For example, a territorial connection exists with the State where an event 
giving rise to the dispute occurred; where a person or thing that is a subject of, or 
affected by, the dispute is located; or where the court adjudicating the dispute is 
located.14 From the perspective of the forum State—the State where a dispute is 
being resolved—the dispute is transnational if it has a personal or territorial 
connection to at least one foreign State. 
There is no universally agreed upon definition of access to justice,15 and this 
Article does not attempt to conclusively settle that definition. Most definitions of 
access to justice, however, incorporate one or more of the following dimensions: 
Formal Legal Dimension: Access to justice requires that persons have a right 
of access to a court where they can bring legal claims.16 Some commentators 
argue that other dispute resolution institutions may be a satisfactory, or even 
preferable, alternative to court access, or at least a beneficial complement to court 
access.17 Others argue that in some contexts, such as mandatory arbitration of 
consumer disputes, alternative dispute resolution methods can create barriers to 
access to justice.18 This Article focuses on courts, without taking a position on 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. These connections are similar to the territorial and personal connections that are commonly 
relevant in private international law (or "conflict of laws") analysis. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. 
BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1, at 1, 
§ 17.85, at 994 (6th ed. 2018). 
 15. PIERRE SCHMITT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF 
INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 91 (Edward Elgar ed., 2017) ("[T]here is no 
standardized concept of the access to justice and the concept of 'access to justice' tolerates a broad 
range of definitions."). 
 16. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 6; Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to 
Justice Under Customary International Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1 (Francesco 
Francioni ed., 2007) ("In a general manner [access to justice] is employed to signify the possibility for 
the individual to bring a claim before a court and have a court adjudicate it."). 
 17. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 21 (2004) (including alternative dispute 
resolution as having potential to improve access to justice); Beqiraj & McNamara, supra note 2, at 8 
("[access to justice] embraces access to dispute resolution mechanisms as part of justice institutions 
that are both formal (i.e., institutions established by the state) and informal (i.e., indigenous courts, 
councils of elders and similar traditional or religious authorities , mediation and arbitration)."); Peter 
Chapman & Alejandro Ponce, How Do We Measure Access to Justice? A Global Survey of Legal 
Needs Shows the Way, OPEN SOC'Y JUST. INITIATIVE (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/how-do-we-measure-access-justice-global-survey-
legal-needs-shows-way (last visited Aug. 2, 2019) ("We must challenge the misconception that courts 
and lawyers are the solution to access-to-justice issues. We should support flexible systems of legal 
assistance that meet people where they are, to help secure outcomes that are more just. Nonlawyers 
and community-based paralegals can play a critical role."). 
 18. See generally Anna Nylund, Access to Justice: Is ADR a Help or Hindrance?, in THE 
FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIGATION: ACCESS TO COURTS AND COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN THE 
NORDIC COUNTRIES 325–44 (Laura Ervo & Anna Nylund eds., 2014); STASZAK, supra note 3, at chap. 
3 (discussing arbitration and access to justice); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests 
of Justice" in the Twenty-First Century: Pursuing Peace As Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1770 
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the ways that other types of dispute resolution institutions may contribute to 
access to justice. 
Institutional Dimension: Access to justice does not merely depend on a right 
of court access, but also on a right of access to a court that is independent, 
impartial, and established by law.19 
Procedural Dimension: Access to justice requires procedural fairness. 
Without procedural fairness, courts cannot provide effective access to justice.20 
Procedural fairness is commonly said to require conditions such as adequate 
notice, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, procedural equality, adversarial 
proceedings, a public hearing, a reasoned decision, a judgment in a reasonable 
time, and enforcement of judgments.21 
Practical Dimension: Beyond the formal legal, institutional, and procedural 
dimensions, there are practical requirements that must be satisfied to make access 
to justice effective.22 These practical requirements include: awareness of one's 
legal rights and defenses (including the right of access to justice itself), 
affordability of access, and availability of legal assistance.23 Some commentators 
 
(2002) (noting "distortions of the 'ADR' process that inhibit . . . access to justice and fairness," such 
as mandatory arbitration clauses in employment, health care and consumer contracts, but proposing 
nuanced understanding based on "the reasons for when and how justice is delivered in different settings 
(and sometimes differentially for different people)."). 
 19. See Francioni, supra note 16, at 3 ("[T]he term [access to justice] would normally refer to 
the right to seek a remedy before a court of law or a tribunal which is constituted by law and which 
can guarantee independence and impartiality in the application of the law."); SCHMITT, supra note 15, 
at 107–13 (identifying independence, impartiality and establishment by law as among the institutional 
requirements of the right of access to justice). Cf. CHARLES T. KOTUBY JR. & LUKE A. SOBOTA, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS 157-97 (2017) (identifying judicial 
impartiality and judicial independence as principles of international due process). 
 20. See FAWCETT, SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAH, supra note 5, at 63 ("[T]he right of access to a 
court would be rendered ineffective if the process by which a dispute was determined was deficient."). 
 21. See id. at 67–72 (identifying equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, a reasoned decision, 
a public hearing, judgment in a reasonable time, and execution of judgments as among the 
requirements for access to justice under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights); SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 114–15 (identifying 
a public hearing, equality of arms, a judgment in a reasonable time, and enforcement of judicial 
decisions as among the procedural requirements for access to justice). Cf. KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra 
note 19. Regarding procedural equality ("equality of arms"), see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 53 (1998) ("The Court reiterates that the principle of equality of arms—a 
component of the broader concept of a fair trial—requires that each party must be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent."). 
 22. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 7–9. See also FAWCETT, SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAH, 
supra note 5, at 62 (noting the following about the right of access to justice under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights: "As 
regards access to a court in fact, there should be no practical obstacles to have a dispute determined. 
This has had some important consequences for the provision of legal assistance and legal aid."). 
 23. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 12 ("[I]t is certainly clear that high costs, to the 
extent that one or both of the parties must bear them, constitute a major access-to-justice barrier."); 
Tom Cornford, The Meaning of Access to Justice, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE 27, 39 (Ellie Palmer, Tom 
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have added that practical inequalities between the parties—such as differences in 
resources and legal experience—can be a barrier to effective access to justice, 
even if other practical requirements are met.24 
Substantive Legal Dimension: Finally, some scholars adopt a more expansive 
concept of access to justice. They argue that access to justice depends on 
substantive law that is capable of producing just outcomes.25 On the one hand, 
such a conception runs the risk of losing analytical distinctiveness by equating 
itself with more general concepts of justice.26 Moreover, the inclusion of a 
substantive legal dimension goes beyond the definition of access to justice in 
several international human rights instruments.27 On the other hand, it is difficult 
to separate access to justice from the possibility of a just outcome. Outcomes not 
only depend on formal, institutional, procedural, and practical factors, but also on 
substantive law.28 Without the possibility of a just outcome, access to justice 
 
Cornford, Audrey Guinchard, & Yseult Marique eds., 2016) ("Properly understood, access to justice 
entails a right of equal access to legal assistance for every citizen."); RHODE, supra note 17, at 20 
("[T]hose who need legal services, but cannot realistically afford them, should have access to 
competent assistance."); Beqiraj & McNamara, supra note 2, at 8 (access to justice requires 
"awareness and understanding" of access-to-justice rights). 
 24. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 10 ("Optimal effectiveness…could be expressed 
as complete 'equality of arms'—the assurance that the ultimate result depends only on the relative legal 
merits of the opposing positions, unrelated to differences which are extraneous to legal strength and 
yet, as a practical matter, affect the assertion and vindication of legal rights. This perfect equality, of 
course, is utopian…the differences between parties can never be completely eradicated. The question 
is how far to push toward the utopian goal, and at what cost."); RHODE, supra note 17, at 5–6 (noting 
that "[i]n most discussions, 'equal justice' implies equal access to the justice system" but reality is that 
"[t]he role that money plays in legal, legislative, and judicial selection processes often skews the law 
in predictable directions"); Deborah L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2002) ("access to an adversarial process is not necessarily access to justice, 
particularly in a system where money often matters more than the merits"). See generally Marc 
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & 
SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 25. See David Goddard, The Judgments Convention—The Current State of Play, 29 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 473, 476 (2019) ("Access to justice means access to practical justice; to just 
outcomes that are given effect."); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 872–73 (2009) (emphasizing that "the substance of legal rights and remedies" 
is an important aspect of access to justice). 
 26. I thank Maya Steinitz for emphasizing this point. 
 27. See, e.g., FAWCETT, SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAH, supra note 5, at 67 (the right to a fair hearing 
entailed by the concept of access to justice recognized by Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights "is to be assessed in terms of process and not outcome; that is, the right to a fair trial 
does not protect substantive fairness"); SHELTON, supra note 5, § 2.2 (distinguishing "access to justice" 
from "substantive redress"). 
 28. See Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel & Mathias M. Siems, Access to Justice and Collective 
Actions, in COLLECTIVE ACTION: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER 
INTERESTS? 1, 1–2 (Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel, & Mathias Siems eds., 2012) ("The term 'access 
to justice' itself consists of two parts, 'access' and 'justice,' which – when read together – can be seen 
as a kind of abbreviation. 'Access' often comes together with 'equal' or 'effective'. It embodies the 
older, more technical and procedural side of the overall concept: It is the question of enabling those in 
need to pursue their legal interests. 'Justice' on the other hand, has a more result-oriented meaning 
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would be illusory; it would be unable to actually provide justice even if formal, 
institutional, procedural, and practical requirements were satisfied. Thus, as one 
commentator puts it, "every discussion [of access to justice] assumes a goal called 
'justice.'"29 
Although this Article does not attempt to settle the definition of access to 
justice, it posits that however defined, its dimensions are essentially the same for 
domestic access to justice and transnational access to justice. In other words, 
insofar as access to justice for parties in domestic disputes depends on the 
satisfaction of formal legal, institutional, procedural, practical, and substantive 
law requirements, access to justice for parties in transnational disputes also 
depends on satisfaction of these requirements. 
However, as the rest of this Article argues, even if the domestic and 
transnational contexts do not imply different definitions of access to justice, they 
do imply different potential barriers to access to justice and a variety of distinctive 
transnational access-to-justice problems that require specially tailored solutions. 
II. 
A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE PROBLEMS 
Transnational disputes raise many of the same access-to-justice challenges 
raised by domestic disputes; but transnational access-to-justice problems differ 
from purely domestic access-to-justice problems in at least three ways. First, the 
transnational character of a dispute can exacerbate certain access-to-justice 
problems that also exist in domestic disputes. Second, there are some distinctive 
barriers to access to justice that arise in transnational disputes because of the 
decentralized structure of the global legal system and the heterogeneity of national 
legal systems. Third, transnational disputes may involve international institutions, 
either as parties or as potential providers of access to justice, in ways that are 
unlikely in most purely domestic disputes. 
A. Exacerbated Access-to-Justice Problems 
First, domestic disputes and transnational disputes share some access-to-
justice problems. However, the transnational context tends to exacerbate them. 
 
which should be reached through equal or effective access: The outcome of the procedure should be 
'just' or at least be made on fair (i.e. unbiased grounds)."). This link between access to justice and the 
possibility of a just outcome is implicit in the US forum non conveniens doctrine. See Piper Aircraft 
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) ("At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the 
court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be 
satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction . . . . In rare 
circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the 
other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, 
for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation 
of the subject matter of the dispute."). 
 29. Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Social and Historical Context, in 2 ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 5, 5 (Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner eds, 1978). 
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Lack of Impartiality. Access to justice requires access to an impartial court.30 
Even in the resolution of purely domestic disputes, impartiality is sometimes 
lacking, thus posing a barrier to access to justice. But this barrier will often be 
greater in transnational disputes. In addition to biases that exist in purely domestic 
disputes, transnational disputes raise the possibility of biases—whether explicit 
or implicit—in favor of domestic parties or against foreign parties.31 Insofar as 
those biases exist, they undermine impartiality, and thus access to justice, in 
transnational disputes. 
Lack of Awareness and Understanding of Rights. To be effective, access to 
justice requires that persons are aware of, and understand, their legal rights.32 
Lack of awareness and understanding are barriers to access to justice in domestic 
disputes, but are likely to be an even greater problem in many transnational 
disputes.33 First, the multistate connections that define transnational disputes may 
create uncertainty about which State's law applies. Ordinarily, the degree of 
uncertainty is lower in purely domestic disputes.34 Second, even if a party knows 
which State's law applies, if it is not the law of the party's own State (foreign law, 
from that party's perspective), the party will likely have less understanding of that 
law. Third, some transnational disputes will raise issues under international law 
or be resolved in international courts. Typically, disputants will have less 
awareness and understanding of international law and the procedures of 
international courts than that of their own law and courts. 
 
 30. As noted above, access to non-court dispute resolution processes may also satisfy this 
requirement under some circumstances. See supra Part I. 
 31. See Utpal Bhattacharya, Neal Galpin & Bruce Haslem, The Home Court Advantage in 
International Corporate Litigation, 50 J. L. & ECON. 625, 629 (2007) (arguing that American courts 
are biased against foreign corporations in international business disputes); Kimberly A. Moore, 
Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1520 (2003) (arguing that American courts 
are biased against foreign litigants in patent disputes); Whytock, The Evolving Forum, supra note 11 
(empirical analysis finding anti-foreigner bias in forum non conveniens decisions). But see Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 464 (2007) (finding that foreigners have higher win-rates than 
domestic parties in US federal courts, and concluding that "the data offer no support for the existence 
of xenophobic bias in U.S. courts"); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of 
Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (2009) (empirical analysis of international choice-of-law 
decisions by US district courts in tort cases challenging claim that there is anti-foreign party bias in 
those decisions). 
 32. See Beqiraj & McNamara, supra note 2, at 8 (access to justice requires "awareness and 
understanding" of access-to-justice rights). 
 33. See, e.g., Vera Shikhelman, Access to Justice in the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, 39 MICH. J. INT'L L. 453, 460 (2018) ("One of the major obstacles to accessing 
international justice is the lack of awareness of the possibility of filing cases and the rights protected 
by human rights treaties."). 
 34. In federal systems, such as the United States, questions about which governmental sub-unit's 
(e.g., which US state's) law applies can create such uncertainties even in purely domestic disputes. 
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Limited Access to Legal Representation. A widely recognized domestic 
access-to-justice problem is limited access to legal representation.35 This problem 
can be magnified in transnational disputes. It may be especially difficult for a 
foreign party to identify a lawyer who is appropriately licensed and qualified to 
represent the party in the forum State, due to possible language differences, 
unfamiliarity with the forum State's legal profession, and lack of connections to 
lawyer referral networks in the forum State. In some cases, a foreign party might 
be able to find a lawyer in the foreign party's home State with the knowledge and 
connections needed to help the party identify a forum State lawyer—but the 
increased costs of consulting both home State and forum State lawyers may not 
be affordable to some parties. 
Lack of Affordability. Lack of affordability is another access-to-justice 
problem that exists in many domestic disputes, but can be exacerbated in 
transnational disputes.36 Beyond the costs of consulting with home State counsel 
to identify appropriate forum State counsel, coordination between home State and 
forum State counsel may be necessary, further increasing costs. In some cases, 
additional costs—such as translation and travel costs—may make access to justice 
even less affordable. These increased costs mean that regardless of their legal 
merits, some smaller claims that might be economically rational in a purely 
domestic context might be economically irrational in a transnational context.37 
Domestic legal measures that can make legal representation more affordable—
such as contingent fee arrangements and procedures for claim aggregation or 
collective redress—do not exist in all States, and States that provide legal aid to 
their citizens do not necessarily provide it to foreign parties.38 
Procedural Barriers. Procedural rules can pose access-to-justice barriers in 
purely domestic disputes. For example, restrictive rules of standing, pleading, and 
jurisdiction, and expansive rules of governmental immunity can "close the 
 
 35. Cornford, supra note 23, at 39 ("Properly understood, access to justice entails a right of 
equal access to legal assistance for every citizen."); RHODE, supra note 17, at 20 ("[T]hose who need 
legal services, but cannot realistically afford them, should have access to competent assistance."). 
 36. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 12 ("[I]t is certainly clear that high costs, to the 
extent that one or both of the parties must bear them, constitute a major access-to-justice barrier."). 
 37. See id., at 13 ("Claims involving relatively small sums of money suffer most from the barrier 
of cost. If the dispute is to be resolved by formal court processes, the costs may exceed the amount in 
controversy or, if not, may still eat away so much of the claim as to make litigation futile."). This 
follows from the basic economic model of litigation, EV=(p*A)-C, where EV is the expected value of 
a claim, p is the probability of winning, A is the amount of the award, and C is the costs of litigation. 
According to that model, a rational litigant will not file a claim unless EV > 0 (that is, if p*A > C). 
See Whytock, The Evolving Forum, supra note 11, at 487 n.25. 
 38. However, the Hague Convention on International Access to Justice aims to avoid this. See 
Hague Convention on International Access to Justice art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1505 ("Nationals 
of any Contracting State and persons habitually resident in any Contracting State shall be entitled to 
legal aid for court proceedings in civil and commercial matters in each Contracting State on the same 
conditions as if they themselves were nationals of and habitually resident in that State."). 
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courthouse door" in many disputes.39 In transnational disputes, there are 
additional procedural doctrines that can limit access to justice.40 These rules 
include foreign sovereign immunity and forum non conveniens.41 Procedural 
rules also limit access to regional and international courts. Typically, the 
jurisdiction of these courts is strictly limited, and even disputes over which they 
might have jurisdiction may be subject to admissibility requirements.42 
Inequalities Between Parties. The "haves" tend to come out ahead when it 
comes to justice for reasons unrelated to the legal strength of the parties' claims 
and defenses.43 This tendency undermines equal access to justice in purely 
domestic disputes.44 Because of the complexities and costs described above, this 
tendency is likely to be even more salient in many transnational disputes, 
especially those in which one party is a particularly experienced and resource-rich 
litigant and the other is not. 
B. Distinctive Access-to-Justice Problems 
In addition to access-to-justice problems that exist in domestic contexts and 
tend to be exacerbated in transnational disputes, some transnational access-to-
justice problems are unlikely to arise in purely domestic disputes. These 
 
 39. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017); STASZAK, supra note 4; Shauhin 
Talesh, The Process is the Problem, in THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE: STUDIES 
INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MALCOLM FEELEY 72–94 (Rosann Greenspan, Hadar Aviram & Jonathan 
Simon eds., 2019). 
 40. See generally Pamela Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015). For 
an overview of these barriers in the United States and the European Union, see MAYA STEINITZ, THE 
CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE 83-104 (2018). 
 41. For empirical analyses of how these doctrines limit court access in US federal courts, see 
Whytock, The Evolving Forum, supra note 11 (forum non conveniens) and Christopher A. Whytock, 
Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2033 (2013) (foreign sovereign 
immunity) [hereinafter Whytock, Foreign State Immunity]. 
 42. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34–36 (governing the Court's 
jurisdiction). See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
695–705 (9th ed. 2019) (discussing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and exceptions 
to its jurisdiction); Mario Oetheimer & Guillem Cano Palomares, European Court of Human Rights, 
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 16–34 (2013) (discussing 
jurisdiction and admissibility requirements of European Court of Human Rights) 
(https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e791?rskey=sK3SuL&result=1&prd=OPIL#). 
 43. See Galanter, supra note 24. See also RHODE, supra note 17, at 5–6 ("The role that money 
plays in legal, legislative, and judicial selection processes often skews the law in predictable 
directions."). 
 44. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 4, at 10 ("Optimal effectiveness…could be expressed 
as complete 'equality of arms'—the assurance that the ultimate result depends only on the relative legal 
merits of the opposing positions, unrelated to differences which are extraneous to legal strength and 
yet, as a practical matter, affect the assertion and vindication of legal rights. This perfect equality, of 
course, is utopian…the differences between parties can never be completely eradicated. The question 
is how far to push toward the utopian goal, and at what cost."). 
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distinctive problems largely arise from the decentralized nature of the global legal 
system.45 In addition to international law and international courts, as well as 
private norms and private forms of dispute resolution, the global legal system also 
includes each State's domestic legal system.46 The multistate connections that 
define a transnational dispute may implicate the legal systems of more than one 
State, and possibly international rules and institutions as well. This is not the case 
in most purely domestic disputes.47 The problem is that there is no central global 
authority to ensure that at least one domestic legal system provides access to 
justice in a given transnational dispute, but that multiple systems do not do so for 
the dispute in ways that conflict with each other. This problem is even more 
complex if, in addition to domestic legal systems, international law applies or an 
international court has jurisdiction. The result is two general categories of access-
to-justice problems: transnational access-to-justice gaps and transnational access-
to-justice conflicts. 
1. Transnational Access-to-Justice Gaps 
A transnational access-to-justice gap arises when no legal system provides 
access to justice in a transnational dispute. There are three basic types of 
transnational access-to-justice gaps: jurisdictional gaps, applicable law gaps, and 
recognition and enforcement gaps.48 
A jurisdictional gap arises when no court is available to adjudicate a 
transnational dispute in a way that satisfies the requirements of access to justice.49 
This situation may occur if no State has sufficient connections to the parties or the 
dispute to give it authority to adjudicate under its domestic law or under 
international law. This may also occur even if a State has authority to adjudicate. 
For example, a State might not have a legal system that satisfies the institutional 
requirements (such as impartial and independent courts), procedural requirements 
(fair procedures), or practical requirements (such as affordability and access to 
legal representation) for access to justice. 
 
 45. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Concept of a Global Legal System, in THE MANY LIVES 
OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP'S BOLD PROPOSAL (Peer 
Zumbansen ed., 2020). 
 46. In addition, the global legal system includes private norms and private forms of transnational 
dispute resolution. Id. 
 47. However, in a State organized as a federal system, access-to-justice problems analogous to 
those in transnational disputes may of course arise in disputes that are purely domestic within that 
State but have connections to more than one governmental subunit. 
 48. See MICHAEL BOGDAN, CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 
(2d ed. 2012) (explaining that the rules governing applicable law, jurisdiction, and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments are interconnected and must be coordinated "to avoid the risk of creating a 
legal vacuum"). 
 49. Maya Steinitz has referred to this as the "problem of the missing forum." See STEINITZ, 
supra note 40. 
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Even if there is a State that both possesses authority to adjudicate and 
satisfies the institutional, procedural, and practical requirements for access to 
justice, that State may nevertheless decline to adjudicate the dispute.50 For 
example, a court in a State that recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
may exercise its discretion to dismiss a transnational dispute in favor of a foreign 
court. It may do so even if it has the authority to adjudicate that dispute.51 
However, it is often uncertain whether the foreign court will actually provide 
access to justice. First, it is uncertain whether the other State's court will agree to 
adjudicate the dispute. A court dismissing a transnational dispute on forum non 
conveniens grounds has no authority to require another State's court to adjudicate 
the dispute, leaving the possibility of a jurisdictional gap.52 Even if the foreign 
court agrees to adjudicate the dispute, the increased costs of litigating in the other 
State may lead a party to abandon its claim, even if the claim is legally strong.53 
Furthermore, even if the foreign court actually adjudicates the dispute, the access-
to-justice gap will remain if the foreign State lacks the rule of law and impartial, 
independent courts. In still other cases, a State's forum non conveniens doctrine 
may allow a court to dismiss a transnational dispute in favor of a foreign court 
even when the same State's judgment enforcement doctrine would not allow 
enforcement of a judgment issued by that foreign court.54 In all of these ways, the 
forum non conveniens doctrine can undermine transnational access to justice by 
creating jurisdictional gaps. 
Similarly, the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine can lead to jurisdictional 
gaps. This doctrine may require a court in one State to dismiss a claim against a 
foreign State's government, even if the court would otherwise have the authority 
to adjudicate the dispute. Beyond that, the doctrine may also prevent other States 
from adjudicating the dispute, leaving only the foreign State's own courts 
available.55 This situation raises the possibility of two additional problems. First, 
 
 50. Or, in cases involving multiple defendants, the State may assert jurisdiction as to one (or 
some) defendants and not other (or all) defendants, requiring the plaintiff to pursue access to justice 
simultaneously in multiple States. The increased costs of pursuing multiple rather than a single suit 
may in some cases pose a significant access-to-justice barrier. 
 51. For a comparative analysis of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, see RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (2007). 
 52. A dispute dismissed from a court on forum non conveniens grounds will only continue in a 
foreign court if the plaintiff refiles the suit in the foreign court and the foreign court asserts jurisdiction. 
See David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in 
Uncontrolled Discretion," 29 TEX. INT'L L. J. 353, 370 (1994) ("[A] court in New York cannot transfer 
a case to a court in India. It can only dismiss, impose conditions, and wish the plaintiffs 'Godspeed.'"). 
 53. See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather 
Fantastic Fiction," 103 L. Q. REV. 398, 418–20 (1987) (concluding only 14.5% of personal injury 
plaintiffs and 16.6% of commercial plaintiffs refiled cases abroad after forum non conveniens 
dismissals). 
 54. See generally Whytock & Burke Robertson, supra note 8. 
 55. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity, supra note 41. 
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the foreign State's internal rules of sovereign immunity may prevent adjudication 
there. Second, the foreign State may lack rule of law or impartial and independent 
courts. In either situation, the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine can contribute 
to a jurisdictional gap that prevents access to justice.56 
The interaction of corporate law and jurisdictional rules can also lead to 
jurisdictional gaps in transnational disputes. Many multinational corporations 
have a parent company in a "home" State and engage in business activities in a 
"host" State through subsidiaries. If those activities injure a person in the host 
State, that person might, on the one hand, seek a remedy in a host State court. 
However, access to justice might be unavailable in the host State if it lacks rule of 
law or impartial and independent courts. Access to justice may also be unavailable 
if the host State is reluctant to deter foreign investment by imposing liability or if 
the subsidiary has insufficient assets to satisfy a resulting judgment. On the other 
hand, the injured person might seek a remedy in a court of the parent company's 
home State. However, access to justice might not be available there either, 
because the subsidiary might lack sufficient contacts with the home State for a 
court there to have jurisdiction, the applicable rules of corporate law may preclude 
the liability of the parent company for the acts of its subsidiary, or the home State's 
courts might dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds. This "impasse" 
means that persons harmed in one State by the activities of a multinational 
business based in another State might lack access to justice in both States.57 
An applicable law gap arises when a court fails to apply substantive law 
under which a transnational dispute is capable of being resolved justly.58 This 
may occur in at least three different ways. First, in theory, there may be situations 
in which no State's law recognizes a claim or defense for which recognition 
would, in principle, be required by justice, thus making an applicable law gap 
inevitable.59 Second, the forum State may have substantive law that is capable of 
 
 56. Cf. Richard Garnett, Foreign State Immunity: A Private International Law Analysis, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297, 306–10 
(Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 2015) (positing access-to-justice concerns as one reason to abolish the 
principles of foreign sovereign immunity); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 109, 342 (Robert 
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (foreign sovereign immunity can "den[y] . . . a legal 
remedy in respect of what may be a valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection"). 
 57. See Daniel Augustein, Torture as Tort? Transnational Tort Litigation for Corporate-
Related Human Rights Violations and the Human Right to a Remedy, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 593, 596–
97 (2018). See also Pigrau & Cardesa-Salzmann, supra note 8 (arguing that multinational corporations 
"have been quite successful in escaping the meshes of justice in this global patchwork of national 
judiciaries with largely territorial powers"). 
 58. Of course, if one does not include the substantive legal requirements discussed in Part I as 
part of the concept of access to justice, then one might not consider an applicable law gap to be an 
access-to-justice problem. 
 59. Similarly, a court might decide not to decide the merits of a claim "due to the absence of 
suitable law [or] the vagueness or ambiguity of rules," which is known as a non liquet. See Ulrich 
Fastenrath & Franziska Knur, Non Liquet, in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) 
(https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0130.xml). 
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producing a just outcome, but the court may decline to apply that law based on 
domestic or international legal principles that limit the extraterritorial application 
of domestic law, and then dismiss the case rather than deciding it under foreign 
law.60 If no other State's courts are able and willing to adjudicate the dispute, or 
if no other State's law is capable of producing a just outcome, this will lead to an 
applicable law gap.61 Third, the court may decline to apply forum law and instead 
apply foreign law based on choice-of-law principles, or vice versa. This choice of 
law leads to an applicable law gap if the chosen law is incapable of producing a 
just outcome.62 In these situations, applicable law gaps may arise that undermine 
transnational access to justice.63 
As noted above, whether a given State's law is capable of producing a just 
outcome will be contestable in most cases because understandings of justice vary 
across States and across cultures. Yet the possibility of a just outcome is 
unavoidably part of the concept of access to justice. For this reason, the problem 
of applicable law gaps merits attention even if they are difficult to identify with 
certainty. In some cases, however—such as when a law is inconsistent with 
widely recognized human rights—there may be a high degree of agreement that a 
particular State's law cannot produce a just outcome.  
A recognition and enforcement gap arises when an impartial and 
independent court in one State enters a judgment resolving a transnational dispute 
in a manner that fulfills the requirements of access to justice, but other States' 
 
 60. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (dismissing securities 
fraud claim brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign and US defendants for their misconduct as to 
securities traded on foreign stock exchanges, because the US statute upon which the claim was based 
did not apply extraterritorially). 
 61. Of course, in some such cases there may be an alternative forum willing to adjudicate the 
dispute and apply law that is capable of producing a just outcome. In the Morrison case, some plaintiffs 
indeed pursued their claims in Australian courts, and their claims were ultimately settled. See Grant 
Swanson, A Comparative Law Analysis of Private Securities Litigation in the Wake of Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 989 (2012) ("At the time of writing this 
comment, the Morrison plaintiffs have filed a complaint against NAB in the Supreme Court of Victoria 
regarding the HomeSide allegations with a commercial litigation funder financing the costs."); 
Pathway Invs. Pty Ltd. v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., [2012] V.S.C. 625 (Austl.); NAB Class Action 
Update, MAURICE BLACKBURN (Feb. 2014), https://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/class-
actions/past-class-actions/nab-shareholder-class-action/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
 62. See Axel Halfmeier, Is There a World Courthouse on Foley Square? On Civil Procedure, 
Private International Law and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation, in 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: CIVIL SOCIETY 81, 93 (Peter Odell & Chris Willett eds., 2008) 
(explaining how in human rights cases, the application of the traditional place-of-the-wrong rule can 
result in the application of the law of the same State that violated the claimant's human rights, in 
accordance with how that State would interpret that law, even if that State is a dictatorship, such that 
"one would return control over the plaintiff's claim to the legal system in which the abuses took place"). 
 63. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 2013) (Iraqi 
citizens filed tort claims against a US private military contractor for abuse and torture while they were 
detained in Abu Ghraib, Iraq; court determined that Iraqi law, which had been promulgated by the US-
led Coalition Provisional Authority, applied, and because that law granted immunity to military 
contractors, the suit was dismissed), vacated on other grounds. 
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courts decline to recognize or enforce the judgment.64 For example, a court in one 
State may resolve a transnational dispute by ordering the non-prevailing party (the 
"judgment debtor") to pay a sum of money to the prevailing party (the "judgment 
creditor") as a remedy, but the judgment debtor might refuse to pay. In purely 
domestic disputes, the judgment debtor will typically have assets in the forum 
State, and the court can order the attachment and sale of those assets to satisfy the 
judgment. In transnational disputes, however, it is not unusual for the judgment 
debtor to lack assets in the forum State. In this situation, the judgment creditor 
will seek a State where the judgment debtor has assets and ask a court there to 
enforce the judgment against those assets. If the court refuses to enforce the 
judgment, the judgment creditor will be left without a remedy, thus preventing 
complete access to justice.65  
Three final points on transnational access-to-justice gaps deserve attention. 
First, the discussion above has pointed to various legal doctrines—including 
conflict-of-laws doctrines, the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the foreign 
sovereign immunity doctrine—as potential contributors to transnational access-
to-justice gaps. But this does not mean that those doctrines are categorically 
inappropriate. To the contrary, they generally are based on legitimate policies. 
The point is rather that in spite of any virtues these doctrines may have, they can 
 
 64. The link between access to justice and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
is well-established under European human rights law and European Union Law. See FAWCETT, 
SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAW, supra note 5, at 78–79 (discussing the role of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human rights); Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 67(4), Dec. 17, 2007, 2010 O.J. 
(C 306) 1 ("The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual 
recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters."). Access to justice is also a leading 
rationale for the Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil 
or Commercial Matters, under consideration by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
See Francisco Garcimartin & Genevieve Saumier, Judgments Convention: Revised Draft Explanatory 
Report 5 (Dec. 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/7d2ae3f7-e8c6-4ef3-807c-15f112aa483d.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2019) ("This draft Convention seeks to promote access to justice globally through 
enhanced judicial cooperation…. First, and most importantly, the draft Convention will ensure that 
judgments to which it applies will be recognised and enforced in all Contracting States, thereby 
enhancing the practical effectiveness of those judgments and ensuring that a successful party can 
obtain meaningful relief. Access to justice is frustrated if a wronged party obtains a judgment which 
cannot be enforced in practice because the other party and/or the other party's assets are in another 
State where thee judgment is not readily enforceable."). See also ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO 
TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 71 (2011) ("[T]he right of 
access to justice comprises…the right to protection by means of faithful compliance with judicial 
decisions."); Goddard, supra note 25 ("Access to justice means access to practical justice; to just 
outcomes that are given effect. In today's increasingly globalized world, it is frequently necessary for 
that practical effect to span borders, if justice is to be effective. So the goal of access to justice [entails] 
access to just outcomes that are practically effective in every State where they need to be 
implemented…."); Christopher A. Whytock, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Governance, Rights, 
and the Market for Dispute Resolution Services, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT: 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 47, 52 (Hans W. Micklitz & Andrea Wechsler 
eds., 2016) (explaining the link between foreign judgment enforcement and access to justice). 
 65. See Whytock & Burke Robertson, supra note 8, at 1463–64. 
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impose transnational access-to-justice costs, and those costs must be considered 
in any analysis of those doctrines. 
Second, while this discussion has focused primarily on domestic courts and 
domestic law, the global legal system also includes international courts and 
international law. As discussed below, a regional or international court may 
occasionally be able to fill jurisdictional gaps by adjudicating transnational 
disputes—but the jurisdiction of these courts is generally very limited.66 
Moreover, in some cases international law may be able to fill applicable law gaps 
by supplying rules of decision that can produce just outcomes when domestic 
courts adjudicate transnational disputes—but there are domestic law limits on the 
authority of domestic courts to apply international law, and those limits are quite 
strict in some States.67 Thus, international courts and international law presently 
do not provide complete solutions to the transnational access-to-justice gaps 
discussed above.  
Third, all three types of transnational access-to-justice gaps—jurisdictional 
gaps, applicable law gaps, and recognition and enforcement gaps—are due to the 
highly decentralized nature of the global legal system.68 In theory, these gaps 
could be avoided if there were a centralized authority that could effectively 
coordinate the world's domestic legal systems to ensure an available court, 
applicable law, and recognition and enforcement for every transnational dispute. 
However, it is difficult to imagine such a solution in the foreseeable future. 
2. Transnational Access-to-Justice Conflicts 
A transnational access-to-justice conflict may arise when two or more States 
attempt to provide access to justice for the same transnational dispute. A paradox 
underlies transnational access-to-justice conflicts: Individually each State may 
satisfy the requirements of access to justice, but collectively they may create 
 
 66. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, 
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). 
 67. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 45-100 (9th ed. 2019). 
 68. Currently, there is no rule of public international law requiring a State to exercise jurisdiction 
that it possesses, even when exercising jurisdiction would be necessary to avoid a transnational access-
to-justice gap. See Alex Mills, Connecting Public and Private International Law, in LINKAGES AND 
BOUNDARIES IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 23 (Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, 
Kasey McCall-Smith & Duncan French eds., 2018) ("[W]hile public international law establishes that 
a state may not impose its regulation in the absence of a recognised justification, it does not (at least 
generally) require that a state regulation be exercised where such a recognised justification exists. 
Principles of access to justice, developing particularly in the context of human rights law, may in the 
future have an increased role in requiring states to exercise and perhaps even expand their grounds of 
civil jurisdiction, but at present they have had a limited influence, except in relation to the protection 
of weaker parties (like consumers or employees) and less frequently in the adoption of forum of 
necessity rules of jurisdiction."). 
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access-to-justice problems.69 There are three basic types of transnational access-
to-justice conflicts: jurisdictional conflicts, applicable law conflicts, and 
judgments conflicts. 
Jurisdictional conflicts may arise when courts in two or more States assert 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same dispute—that is, when there is parallel 
litigation.70 Each court may have a reasonable basis for asserting jurisdiction, and 
each State's legal system may have procedural rules that satisfy access-to-justice 
requirements. However, when multiple courts assert jurisdiction over the same 
dispute, the parties are forced to litigate their dispute in multiple States, which 
may greatly increase costs.71 This is inefficient, and in some cases a party may 
find it cost prohibitive for a party to pursue or defend litigation in more than one 
State, even if their claims or defenses are legally strong. In addition, parallel 
litigation raises the specter of further access-to-justice problems, including 
applicable law conflicts and judgment conflicts, as discussed below.72 
Applicable law conflicts may arise when the legal rules of two or more States 
provide different rights or impose different obligations for parties in the same 
transnational dispute. For example, one State's law may recognize a given claim 
or defense, while another State's law might not. Subjecting a party to inconsistent 
legal rules in the same dispute is inconsistent with access to justice. In purely 
domestic disputes, applicable law conflicts are unlikely because a State's domestic 
legal rules generally are (or generally should be) internally consistent,73 and 
 
 69. Cf. Duncan French & Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Jurisdiction: Betwixt Unilateralism and 
Global Coordination, in LINKAGES AND BOUNDARIES IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
75, 86 (Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Kasey McCall-Smith & Duncan French eds., 2018) ("As private 
international law rules provide for a range of suitable connections, more often than not it is plainly 
possible for the courts of two or more countries to have jurisdiction, i.e., to be competent to adjudicate 
a particular cross-border dispute (known as concurrent jurisdiction). While this could be seen as 
desirable in principle, facilitating the right of access to justice, and fostering global connectivity, yet, 
the downside is the possibility of the abuse of forum shopping tactics, usually by the party that is better 
placed to take advantage of such opportunities. In any case the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction 
by more than one court in parallel proceedings, that is, in cases between the same parties and based on 
the same cause of action, is clearly inefficient."). 
 70. In some cases, however, a court in one State may allow ancillary proceedings to provide 
judicial assistance to a court in another State, without any adjudication of the merits of the case. In 
that situation, the multiple proceedings may actually facilitate transnational access to justice rather 
than undermining it. 
 71. See Goddard, supra note 25 ("[A]t present it is often necessary for a party to a dispute to 
bring substantive proceedings of the same kind in more than one country in order to obtain the desired 
practical outcome. Avoiding the need for duplicative proceedings will contribute significantly to 
access to justice, and to reducing the costs and risks of cross-border dealings."). 
 72. Private international law rules on parallel litigation—e.g. lis pendens stays, antisuit 
injunctions, and first-to-file rules—implicitly attempt to mitigate these problems. They do not question 
the ability of any State individually to offer genuine access to justice, but they at least implicitly 
acknowledge the access-to-justice problems raised by joint assertion of jurisdiction. 
 73. Of course, in States organized as federal systems, different governmental subunits (US 
states, Swiss cantons, etc.) may have different laws, raising federal issues similar to those in 
transnational disputes. 
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ordinarily there would be no reason to consider applying any other State's law.74 
However, when the dispute has multi-State connections, two or more States' laws 
might reasonably be applied to the same dispute. 
An applicable law conflict is most serious if one State's law requires a party 
to do something forbidden by another State's law.75 For example, discovery rules 
in the United States may require a party to respond to another party's discovery 
requests. On the other hand, a "blocking statute" in another State may forbid the 
other party from responding to those requests.76 Neither State's rule is intrinsically 
unjust, but when both States' rules are simultaneously applied the result is unjust: 
A single party will be required to comply with two rules but incapable of 
complying with both. Thus, the party will inevitably be in violation of the law of 
one State or the other. To be clear, the reason that applicable law conflicts can 
pose transnational access-to-justice problems is not that the applicable law of any 
given State is somehow unjust (although that, too, would be a problem), or that 
one State's law is in some sense "better" than the other's.77 Instead, the reason is 
simply that a party may be simultaneously subjected to the laws of more than one 
State and those laws may be inconsistent with each other.  
Judgment conflicts arise when the courts of two or more States enter 
conflicting judgments. For example, in the same transnational dispute between 
the same parties, one court might issue a judgment in favor of one party on an 
issue, and another court might enter a judgement in favor of the other party on the 
same issue.78 Even if each judgment is the result of fair and impartial procedures 
and not in any sense unjust, the judgments together may undermine access to 
 
 74. An exception (albeit an uncommon one) would be a purely domestic contract dispute where 
the contract contains an enforceable choice-of-law clause that indicates the law of a foreign State. 
 75. Cf. Anthony J. Colangelo, Absolute Conflicts of Law, 91 IND. L. J. 719, 729 (2016) ("With 
absolute conflicts of law…it is impossible to comply with both laws simultaneously. This 
impossibility…imports powerful rule of law considerations that disfavor subjecting parties to 
contradictory legal commands in arbitrary fashion."). 
 76. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 966–67 (6th ed. 2018). 
 77. This notion that different laws can both be (but are not necessarily always) just is implicit 
in private international law (foreign law is routinely applied under choice-of-law rules, but those rules 
are typically subject to a public policy exception) and human rights law (which typically confers to 
States a margin of appreciation). See generally HAY, BORCHERS, SYMEONIDES & WHYTOCK supra 
note 14, § 3.15, at 149–51 (discussing public policy exception); ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 
(2012). 
 78. Private international law rules on judgments generally attempt to mitigate these problems 
by refusing recognition and enforcement of a judgment in conflict with an earlier, inconsistent 
judgment and by having a public policy exception. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements art. 9, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98 (last visited Aug. 4, 2019) 
(including both grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement). 
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justice.79 From a plaintiff's perspective, even if one State's court entered a 
judgment providing a remedy, that remedy may be difficult or impossible to 
obtain if a second State's court denies that remedy (especially if the defendant and 
the defendant's assets are in that second State). From a defendant's perspective, 
one State's judgment might impose requirements that are inconsistent or even 
incompatible with those imposed by a second State's judgment, and in some cases 
simultaneous compliance with both might not be possible.  
Access-to-justice conflicts arise because there is no central global authority 
that allocates jurisdiction over each transnational dispute to a single State or 
international court or dictates the application of a single body of law. In this sense, 
access-to-justice conflicts, like access-to-justice gaps, are due to the decentralized 
structure of the global legal system.  
C. Access-to-Justice Problems Involving International Institutions 
In addition to access-to-justice barriers that can be exacerbated in 
transnational disputes and those that are distinctive to transnational disputes, a 
third factor distinguishes transnational access to justice: the role of international 
institutions. 
On the one hand, special access-to-justice problems may arise when 
individuals have claims against international organizations. There are hundreds of 
international organizations in the world that make many positive contributions to 
global governance.80 But they can, and historically they sometimes have, done 
wrong.81 When that happens, access to justice is often lacking. As Pierre Schmitt 
argues in an in-depth study of this problem: 
In cases where the rights of individuals may be threatened or violated by 
international organizations, the aggrieved individual may seek to obtain a remedy 
from the international organization. However, this entails two necessary 
conditions: first, this presupposes the existence of a legal regime governing the 
responsibility of international organizations towards individuals; second, there has 
to be an accountability mechanism where individuals can claim such responsibility 
 
 79. Judgments based on proceedings that do not meet the procedural requirements for access to 
justice, such as impartiality and independence, also raise access-to-justice problems. Ideally, such 
problems are resolved in the State where the judgment was entered through appellate or other review 
procedures, but this cannot be assured in States lacking rule of law. See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 4 cmt. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2005) (explaining that "the 
assertion that intrinsic fraud has occurred should be raised and dealt with in the rendering court"). 
 80. By one count, there were 285 conventional international organizations in 2017, and there 
are an additional 1,655 unconventional international organizations. See Yearbook on International 
Organizations, Figure 2.1: Number of International Organizations by Type, UNION OF INT'L ASS'NS 
(2018). 
 81. See SHELTON, supra note 5, at 45 ("International organizations figure among the non-State 
entities whose proliferation and increased power have raised the question of their responsibility for 
human rights violations. International organizations are taking on many new and extended functions 
throughout the world, from expansion of traditional peacekeeping to governance and managing 
common resources. These new roles place them in a position where they have the capacity to violate 
the human rights of individuals not only within, but outside the organization."). 
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and consequently ask for redress. Nowadays, it is clear that both foundations are to 
a large extent shaky or even inexistent.82 
This access-to-justice gap is due to three factors. First, there is no established 
international legal framework for determining the responsibility of international 
organizations toward individuals.83 The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations adopted by the United Nations International Law 
Commission in 2011 contemplates the invocation of an international 
organization's responsibility only by States and other international 
organizations.84 Second, international courts typically lack jurisdiction over 
claims brought by individuals against international organizations, and not all 
international organizations have internal procedures for handling such claims.85 
Third, access to justice in national courts is often precluded by jurisdictional 
immunities granted to international organizations under domestic or international 
law.86 As Schmitt puts it, this means that "individuals aggrieved by acts of 
international organizations are frequently left out in the cold."87 
On the other hand, international institutions—particularly, international 
courts—can increase access to justice. There are a growing number of 
international courts that, in theory, can help fill transnational access-to-justice 
gaps left open by domestic courts. However, for four reasons, the promise of 
international courts as contributors to access to justice is subject to important 
limits in today's global legal system. First, some international courts are accessible 
only to States. Second, even international courts that allow access to individuals 
and other non-State actors often subject that access to various conditions, such as 
 
 82. SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, 
art. 43 and art. 49, U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 63th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011). Moreover, the Draft 
Articles clearly contemplate obligations that "may be owed to one or more States, to one or more other 
organizations, or to the international community as a whole," but they do not explicitly address 
obligations that may be owed to individuals. See id. at art. 33 ("1. The obligations of the responsible 
international organization set out in this Part may be owed to one or more States, to one or more other 
organizations, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character 
and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 2. This Part is 
without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of an international 
organization, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State or an international 
organization."). See generally RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN 
MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE (Maurizio Ragazzi ed. 2013). 
 85. Id. at 2. See also August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International 
Organizations, 7 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 131, 139 (2001) ("As a rule, international courts have no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against international organizations"). 
 86. RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 84, at 2 (in most cases 
"the only option that remains available to individuals is at the national level and in domestic courts, 
where international organizations generally enjoy immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
enforcement"). On these domestic and international rules of immunity, see generally THE PRIVILEGES 
AND IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (August Reinisch ed. 
2013). 
 87. SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 2. 
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a determination of admissibility, the consent of the respondent State (in claims 
against States), or referral by a commission or other non-judicial body. Third, the 
jurisdiction of international courts is limited by factors that may include subject 
matter, membership, or geographic scope. Fourth, the global legal system lacks 
reliable processes for the enforcement of international court judgments.88 Thus, 
notwithstanding their important contributions, international courts are currently 
unable to provide meaningful access to justice in most transnational disputes, 
especially those between private parties.89 
Finally, while the availability of international courts may increase access to 
justice, it may also contribute to access-to-justice conflicts. As discussed above, 
jurisdictional conflicts can arise if the domestic courts of two or more States assert 
jurisdiction over the same transnational dispute. In some cases, an international 
court—or even more than one international court—may also assert jurisdiction, 
which could lead to a type of jurisdictional conflict that is unlikely to arise in 
purely domestic disputes.90  
To summarize: The role of international institutions distinguishes 
transnational access to justice from domestic access to justice. Special access-to-
justice problems arise when individuals have claims against international 
organizations. International courts can in some cases help remedy access-to-
justice gaps, but they also create potential jurisdictional conflicts. 
III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROBLEM 
This Article has argued that there are important reasons for access-to-justice 
research to examine the distinctive access-to-justice problems faced by parties in 
transnational disputes and in domestic disputes. It has further argued these 
problems should be understood in the context of the decentralized global legal 
system (as well as in the context of domestic legal systems). An additional reason 
to focus on access to justice from a transnational perspective is that access to 
justice is not only a domestic governance problem, but also a global governance 
 
 88. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, 
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). For a discussion of the trend toward providing direct access to individuals 
in international human rights tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, see 
CANÇADO TRINDADE, supra note 64, at ch. II. 
 89. See SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 103 ("It is true—although regrettable—that there are 
currently no global international mechanisms which grant an individual the possibility of exercising 
an effective right of access to justice in the absence of treaty law."). For a proposal for an international 
court that would address this problem, see STEINITZ, supra note 40. 
 90. See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS (2003); YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2007). This possibility has also led to debates over whether 
the increase in international courts is contributing to the fragmentation of international law. See Pierre-
Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Viñuales, The Challenge of "Proliferation": An Anatomy of the Debate, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 143–49 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen 
J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2013). 
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problem.91 First, international law—one of the principal instruments of global 
governance—increasingly recognizes access to justice as a right. Second, access 
to justice is on the agendas of various international organizations. Finally, global 
governance itself depends significantly on access to justice. For these three 
reasons, access to justice is more than a matter of domestic governance—it is a 
global governance problem, too. 
A. International Law and Access to Justice 
International law increasingly recognizes access to justice as a right. This 
right is more firmly established in some areas of international law than others. As 
such, it may be premature to state that a general international legal right to access 
to justice exists, even if such a right would be desirable. Nevertheless, as 
Francesco Francioni concludes, "access to justice has come a long way towards 
its recognition as a true enforceable right under international law."92 
One well established aspect of access to justice is the customary international 
law duty of a State to provide basic justice to foreigners injured within its 
territory.93 A "denial of justice" occurs when a State violates that duty.94 As one 
exhaustive study concludes, even if the precise scope of the concept of denial of 
justice is not entirely settled, it clearly includes a State's refusal to allow foreigners 
to establish their rights before the State's ordinary courts.95 More specifically, 
"[d]enial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction 
of access to courts, gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial 
 
 91. See generally Ziller, supra note 8; Javier L. Ochoa Munoz, Transnational Access to Justice 
and Global Governance (Introductory Comments to the ASADIP Principles on Transnational Access 
to Justice), 20 REVISTA DE DIREITO BRASILEIRA 336 (2018) (introducing principles "designed to help 
guarantee fundamental rights, especially the right of access to justice, from a perspective of global 
governance") (abstract available at 
https://go.gale.com/ps/anonymous?id=GALE%7CA598536992&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&li
nkaccess=abs&issn=2237583X&p=AONE&sw=w). The ASADIP Principles are discussed below. 
The link to domestic governance is well established. See Michael M. Karayanni, The Extraterritorial 
Application of Access to Justice Rights: On the Availability of Israeli Courts to Palestinian Plaintiffs, 
in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 210, 218 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego 
P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2014) (arguing that "[t]he most fundamental value…is achieving access to 
justice as a basic tool in a participatory democracy" and that "[t]o have access to justice means to 
belong to the realm of societal decision; to be excluded from one is to be denied the other"). See also 
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 7 (last visited Aug. 4, 2019) ("There are strong links 
between establishing democratic governance, reducing poverty and securing access to justice."). 
 92. Francioni, supra note 16, at 54. 
 93. See Francioni, supra note 16, at 10 (arguing that access to justice is "an integral part of the 
guarantees provided by the international standard on the treatment of aliens"); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL 
OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005) (arguing that the duty of States "to provide decent justice 
to foreigners" is "one of [international law's] oldest principles"). 
 94. See PAULSSON, supra note 93, at 62 (defining the customary international law concept of 
"denial of justice" as a State's "administ[ration] [of] justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair 
manner"). 
 95. Id. at 65 (referencing a study by Vattel, who proposed that not allowing foreigners to 
establish rights before the ordinary courts comprised a denial of justice). 
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process, failure to provide those guarantees which are generally considered 
indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust 
judgment."96  
However, this right to access to justice is limited to foreign nationals, and it 
is a right only against the State in which the foreign national suffered the alleged 
injury.97 
An international legal right to access to justice for human rights violations is 
also widely recognized. A variety of human rights treaties explicitly provide such 
a right. For example, Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity."98 Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union provides: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.99 
Article 7(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides: 
"Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises…[inter alia] [t]he right to an appeal to competent national organs 
against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by 
conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force…."100 
Beyond these treaty provisions, some experts argue that customary 
international law recognizes a right to access to justice for violations of human 
rights law.101 Such a right has also been declared by the United Nations General 
 
 96. Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage 
Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supplement) 131, 
134 (1929). See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (7th ed. 2008) 
(referring to the Harvard study as probably "the best guide" to the concept's meaning). 
 97. See Francioni, supra note 16, at 9 (explaining these and other limits). 
 98. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
 99. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 18. 
 100. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
 101. See SHELTON, supra note 5, at 432 ("The right of access to judicial remedies is widely 
guaranteed in international human rights treaties and can be considered as part of the corpus of the 
customary international law of human rights."); Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Access to Justice in 
Constitutional and International Law: The Recent Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court, 24 IT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 13 (2014) ("The right of access to justice for violations of human rights (or at least of 
fundamental human rights) is, in my opinion, now established by a customary international norm."). 
See also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
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Assembly: "A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of 
a serious violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an 
effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law."102 
A more general international legal right to access to justice—one that extends 
beyond human rights violations to other types of disputes—is also recognized, but 
to a more limited extent. For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights broadly provides that: "Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the constitution or by law."103 Article 8 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights states that: "Every person has the right to a hearing, 
with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, 
and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any 
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his 
rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature."104Article 5 of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Human Rights Declaration provides: 
"Every person has the right to an effective and enforceable remedy, to be 
determined by a court or other competent authorities, for acts violating the rights 
granted to that person by the constitution or by law."105 Article 12 of the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights provides: "The States parties…shall…guarantee every 
person subject to their jurisdiction the right to seek a legal remedy before courts 
of all levels."106 
In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights to recognize a broad right to access 
to justice. Article 6 provides that "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and 
 
Cançado Trindade, 2012 I.C.J. (Feb. 3); Francioni, supra note 16, at 41 (human rights treaties and 
judicial practice show that "access to justice is generally recognized as a human right in the context of 
domestic law and that every state is under an obligation to fulfill such right by making available a 
system of effective remedies to all persons subject to its jurisdiction and under its control"); Manfred 
Nowak, The Right of Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations to Reparation, in RENDERING JUSTICE 
TO THE VULNERABLE—LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF THEO VAN BOVEN 203 (Fons Coomans ed. 
2000) (arguing that "the right of victims of (gross) human rights violations to adequate reparation … is 
already fairly well established under present international law"). 
 102. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, U.N. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc A/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 8, GA Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., 
Resolutions, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 104. American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673. 
 105. Ass'n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (Nov. 19, 2012), 
https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/. 
 106. Arab Charter on Human Rights, League of Arab States, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l 
Hum. Rts. Rep. 893. See also id. at art. 13 ("1. Everyone has the right to a fair trial that affords adequate 
guarantees before a competent, independent and impartial court that has been constituted by law to 
hear any criminal charge against him or to decide on his rights or his obligations. Each State party 
shall guarantee to those without the requisite financial resources legal aid to enable them to defend 
their rights. 2. Trials shall be public, except in exceptional cases that may be warranted by the interests 
of justice in a society that respects human freedoms and rights."). 
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obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law."107 As the European Court of Human Rights has held: 
[Article 6] secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights 
and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way the Article embodies 
the "right to a court," of which the right of access, that is the right to institute 
proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only. To this are 
added the guarantees laid down by Article 6…as regards both the organisation and 
composition of the court, and the conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole 
makes up the right to a fair hearing.108 
Notwithstanding these treaty provisions, a general right to access to justice 
does not appear to be as widely recognized as the right implicit in the denial of 
justice concept or the right in the context of human rights violations. 
The right to access to justice is also expressed in a variety of private 
international law (or "conflict of laws") doctrines.109 For example, under the 
doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity (forum necessitatis), "a court has exceptional 
jurisdiction if justice so demands, even absent the usual requirements, because no 
other forum is available to the plaintiff."110 The doctrine is sometimes justified 
as permitted, or even required, by either a legal right to access to justice or the 
international law prohibition of denial of justice.111 In addition, the right to access 
to justice is implicit in the adequate alternative forum requirement of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine.112 Although the doctrine may permit denial of court 
access in a particular forum, the alternative forum requirement embodies the 
 
 107. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 98, at art. 6. 
 108. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1975). For a detailed analysis of 
the rights protected by Article 6, see FAWCETT, SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAH, supra note 5, at 60–79. 
 109. See generally J. J. Fawcett, General Report, in DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (J. J. Fawcett ed., 1995). 
 110. Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1053–54 (2006). 
See also Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law, 84 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 187, 223–
24 (2014) ("'[F]orum of necessity' rules…support[] an assertion of jurisdictional power (and event 
duty) to protect the rights of private parties in the absence of the connections of territory or nationality 
which would traditionally be required under private or public international law rules of jurisdiction."). 
 111. See French & Ruiz Abou-Nigm, supra note 69, at 98 ("[T]he rationale underpinning [forum 
of necessity jurisdiction] is considered to be based on, or even imposed by, the right to a fair trial under 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights."); Arnaud Nuyts, Study on Residual 
Jurisdiction: General Report (2007), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.193.8681&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2019) (commenting that the jurisdiction by necessity principle is, in some States, based 
on the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of denial of justice). 
 112. Typically, dismissal is not permitted on forum non conveniens grounds unless there is an 
adequate alternative forum in which the plaintiff may pursue the claim. See Fawcett, supra note 109, at 
14–15 ("It is an essential requirement for declining jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens 
in Britain, other Commonwealth States, and the United States that there is an alternative forum 
abroad."). 
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principle that a forum non conveniens dismissal should not deny the plaintiff 
access to justice altogether.113 
As this discussion shows, international law—one of the principal instruments 
of global governance—widely recognizes access to justice as a right. The scope 
of this right, and its status as customary international law, are not entirely settled. 
Nevertheless, its recognition shows that access to justice is a global governance 
issue, not merely a domestic governance issue. Of course, as Part II's discussion 
of transnational access-to-justice gaps and transnational access-to-justice 
conflicts showed, the right to access to justice is far from fully realized in practice. 
B. International Organizations and Access to Justice 
Another indication that access to justice is a global governance problem is 
that promotion of access to justice is on the agendas of governmental and 
nongovernmental international organizations.114 One of the targets of the United 
Nations' Sustainable Development Goals is to "ensure equal access to justice for 
all."115 The United Nations Development Programme116 and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development117 are among the international 
organizations promoting access to justice. International nongovernmental 
organizations promoting access to justice include the World Justice Project,118 
the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, and the International Bar Association.119 
As is the case with access-to-justice scholarship, most of the access-to-justice 
work of international organizations focuses on domestic access to justice. 
However, there are notable exceptions. For example, in 1980, the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law adopted the Convention on International 
Access to Justice, which declares that the signatories "[d]esir[e] to facilitate 
 
 113. See Whytock & Burke Robertson, supra note 8, at 1454–62 (arguing that the alternative 
forum requirement is "[t]o ensure that the plaintiff will have court access somewhere and that the 
dismissal will not entirely deny the plaintiff access to justice" but observing adequacy standard applied 
to a putative alternative forum is very lenient in practice and therefore might not effectively ensure 
such access); Mills, supra note 111, at 226–27 ("English courts…have increasingly considered the 
availability of an alternative forum before which the claimant can practically achieve justice to be one 
of the central questions in exercising the forum non conveniens discretion. In the absence of such an 
alternative forum English proceedings are highly likely to continue, to ensure that the claimant has 
'access to justice.'"). 
 114. For an overview of other access-to-justice initiatives by international organizations, see 
MacDonald, supra note 3, at 497–98. 
 115. UNITED NATIONS, Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 16, Target 16.3, 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
 116. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 7. 
 117. ORGANISATION FOR ECO. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Access to Justice, 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/access-to-justice.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
 118. Global Insights on Access to Justice, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/special-reports/global-insights-access-
justice (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
 119. See, e.g., Beqiraj & McNamara, supra note 2. 
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international access to justice" and provides that "[n]ationals of any Contracting 
State and persons habitually resident in any Contracting State shall be entitled to 
legal aid for court proceedings in civil and commercial matters in each 
Contracting State on the same conditions as if they themselves were nationals of 
and habitually resident in that State."120 The Principles on Transnational Access 
to Justice approved in 2016 by the American Association of Private International 
Law (ASADIP) is another important project focused specifically on access-to-
justice issues that arise in transnational disputes.121 
C. Global Governance and Access to Justice 
As discussed in the last two Sections, certain principles of international law 
and certain international organizations aim to improve access to justice. However, 
the relationship between global governance and access to justice is not one-way—
access to justice can also improve the quality of global governance. 
First, transnational access to justice can enhance the legitimacy of global 
governance. One threat to this legitimacy is the perception—and to some extent 
the reality—that global governance is dominated by a relatively small number of 
powerful States and multinational business interests. Individuals, civil society 
groups and other less powerful actors often perceive little opportunity for them to 
participate in and voice grievances about global governance. Broader 
transnational access to justice for such grievances—whether provided by national 
or international courts—could enhance the legitimacy of global governance by 
giving these stakeholders more involvement and voice. In this sense, access to 
justice is, in the words of Jacques Ziller, "[un] instrument d'inclusion dans la 
gouvernance mondiale"—an instrument of inclusion in global governance.122 
Second, transnational access to justice can enhance the effectiveness of 
global governance. Courts play an important role in domestic governance.123 
 
 120. Hague Convention on International Access to Justice, supra note 38. 
 121. AM. ASS'N OF PRIV. INT'L L., supra note 5. Although not explicitly organized around the 
goal of transnational access to justice, two other projects on transnational civil procedure address many 
topics that are relevant to transnational access to justice: the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure adopted in 2004, and the current ELI–UNIDROIT Transnational 
Principles of Civil Procedure project. See, Study LXXVIA - Transnational Civil Procedure - 
Formulation of Regional Rules, UNIDROIT https://www.unidroit.org/work-in-
progress/transnational-civil-procedure (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
 122. Ziller, supra note 8, at 41. See also Rachel A. Cichowski, Introduction: Courts, Democracy, 
and Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 3, 7 (2006) (Emphasis added) ("[E]xtending public access to 
courts can increase citizen and interest group participation in the development, monitoring, and 
enforcement of laws . . ."). 
 123. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE, SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION (2002). 
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They also play an important role in global governance.124 Domestic courts also 
contribute to global governance, by helping allocate governance authority among 
States, international institutions, and private actors, and by determining the rights 
and obligations of persons in transnational disputes.125 This is called 
"transnational judicial governance."126 However, neither international courts nor 
domestic courts act on their own. Instead, they must be activated by disputants 
with legal claims. As Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet put it, "litigants 
activate courts, and thus it is obvious that patterns of litigation partly fix the 
parameters for how judges impact politics."127 Transnational access to justice 
allows private parties to perform that role, thereby enabling transnational judicial 
governance.128  
Third, and closely related to effectiveness, transnational access to justice can 
improve oversight in global governance. Any effective system of governance 
requires some degree of oversight to determine whether rules are being followed 
and when steps need to be taken to elicit compliance. In their study of 
congressional oversight of administrative agencies, US political scientists 
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz distinguish two basic forms of 
oversight: "police patrols" and "fire alarms."129 The police patrol approach is 
"comparatively centralized, active, and direct: at its own initiative, Congress 
examines a sample of executive agency activities, with the aim of detecting and 
remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, 
discouraging such violations."130 The "fire alarm" approach is "less centralized 
and involves less active and direct intervention than police-patrol oversight." 
Instead, it relies on "a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that 
enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative 
 
 124. See generally COURTS CROSSING BORDERS: BLURRING LINES OF SOVEREIGNTY (Mary L. 
Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2005) (reviewing the role of international courts in world politics). 
 125. Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 69, 
75–96 (2009). 
 126. See Christopher A. Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, 2 ST. JOHN'S J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 55 (2012). 
 127. SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 127, at 293. See also Pamela K. Bookman, The 
Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, part III.B (2016) (arguing 
that global forum shopping contributes to regulatory enforcement through private litigation); Hannah 
L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International 
Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001) (discussing the role of private litigants in judicial 
regulation of transnational economic activity). 
 128. Karayanni, supra note 91, at 217 ("Because courts do not solicit litigants to file claims so 
that they can eventually render judgments on a certain topic but are dependent on claimants' initiatives, 
it is imperative and instrumental for the judiciary to guarantee litigants a meaningful right of access to 
courts in order to fulfil its functions as a branch of government. It is through the handling of disputes 
that courts shape and influence policy, whether by the mere fact of setting a precedent, by rendering 
relief that affects the rights and status of numerous others, or by clarifying the meaning of law."). 
 129. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 130. Id. 
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decisions…, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and 
to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself."131 McCubbins and 
Schwartz argue that the fire alarm approach will often be optimal.132 
The distinction between police patrols and fire alarms also applies to global 
governance.133 A police patrol approach to oversight in global governance would 
require centralized global institutions actively monitoring compliance—but due 
to lack of resources and lack of political will, the feasibility of such an approach 
would be remote on a global scale. An alternative is a fire alarm approach that 
encourages private parties to draw attention to violations by seeking remedies in 
court. By enabling private parties to perform this role, transnational access to 
justice can enhance the oversight function in, and ultimately the effectiveness of, 
global governance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued for three shifts in thinking about access to justice. 
First, to understand the full range of access-to-justice problems that exist in the 
world, access-to-justice studies should explicitly incorporate the perspective of 
parties in transnational disputes, not just the perspective of parties in purely 
domestic disputes. Second, due to the multi-State connections that define 
transnational disputes, transnational access to justice should be understood in the 
context of the decentralized global legal system, not only in the context of 
individual domestic legal systems. This global context tends to exacerbate access-
to-justice problems in transnational disputes and it gives rise to a variety of access-
to-justice problems that are distinctive to transnational disputes, such as 
transnational access-to-justice gaps and transnational access-to-justice conflicts. 
Third, access to justice should be understood as a global governance problem, not 
only a domestic governance problem. 
These three shifts, in turn, raise important questions that can serve as focal 
points for three streams of further transnational access-to-justice research. First, 
beyond the access-to-justice problems described in this Article, what other access-
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 171. The authors provide two reasons for generally favoring fire-alarm oversight: 
First, legislative goals often are stated in such a vague way that it is hard to decide whether any 
violation has occurred unless some citizen or group registers a complaint. Such a complaint gives 
Congress the opportunity to spell out its goals more clearly-just as concrete cases and controversies 
give courts the opportunity to elucidate legal principles that would be hard to make precise in the 
abstract. Second, whereas a fire-alarm policy would almost certainly pick up any violation of 
legislative goals that seriously harmed an organized group, a police-patrol policy would doubtless miss 
many such violations, since only a sample of executive-branch actions would be examined. 
Id. at 171-72. 
 133. These fire alarms may also enhance the legitimacy of global governance. See Kal Raustiala, 
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 409 (2004) 
("The use of a fire alarm may also enhance the legitimacy of [global governance] by enhancing public 
participation. Citizen participation is a mantra of many advocates of good global governance."). 
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to-justice problems are faced by parties in transnational disputes? What are the 
sources of these transnational access-to-justice problems? How does the global 
legal system contribute to them? 
This first stream of research leads to a second, focused on how to mitigate 
transnational access-to-justice problems. For example, how can private 
international law ("conflict of laws")—including its rules governing jurisdiction, 
forum of necessity, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments—be reformed to better facilitate transnational access to justice and 
reduce the number of transnational access-to-justice gaps? How can private 
international law responses to parallel litigation—such as lis pendens stays, 
antisuit injunctions, and first-to-file rules—be improved to better resolve 
transnational access-to-justice conflicts?134  
Furthermore, how can public international law help mitigate transnational 
access-to-justice problems? What are the prospects for the continued development 
of a customary international legal right to access to justice in transnational 
disputes? How might international legal principles that interfere with 
transnational access to justice—like foreign sovereign immunity—evolve in ways 
that can better accommodate it?135  
This Article's analysis also implies a third stream of research that explores 
how the institutions of global governance—including international courts and 
international organizations—can more effectively promote transnational access to 
justice.136 
By emphasizing transnational access to justice, this Article in no way intends 
to downplay the importance of domestic access to justice. Both aspects of access 
to justice are important. Bringing transnational access to justice into the broader 
research agenda on access to justice will provide a more complete picture of 
access to justice and give needed attention to the distinctive challenges faced by 




 134. One important effort in this direction merits special attention: the American Association of 
Private International Law's (ASADIP) Principles on Transnational Access to Justice, discussed above, 
contain a number of principles that, if implemented, promise to improve transnational access to 
justice—including rules on equal treatment of foreign nationals (art. 2.1), forum necessitatis (art. 3.10), 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (chap. 7), as well as its general principle that 
"[e]ach state shall establish and apply its rules of procedure, seeking to ensure maximum respect for 
human rights, in particular, the right to access to justice." See AM. ASS'N OF PRIV. INT'L L., supra note 
5. In addition, recent scholarship comprehensively surveys the relationship between private 
international law and human rights law in Europe in ways that highlight the potential of private 
international law to improve access to justice. See FAWCETT, SHÚILLEABHÁIN & SHAW, supra note 5. 
 135. See, e.g., Whytock, Foreign State Immunity, supra note 41, at pt. IV (proposing changes to 
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine to better accommodate access-to-justice concerns). 
 136. One important proposal along these lines is for the establishment of an international court 
of civil justice. See STEINITZ, supra note 40. 
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